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1Introduction 
The current situation in Venezuela has been labelled a ‘Humanitarian Crisis’ by different UN organisations as 
well as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM October 2019), which estimates that seven million 
Venezuelans currently need humanitarian assistance - around 23% of the population. According to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to date 4.5 million Venezuelans have left the country (UNHCR, 
October 2019). They have migrated all over the world, but most live within Latin America – with Colombia 
having the largest share. I will argue that there have been two migration waves: one from 1999 to 2014 (starting 
from the rise to power of President Chavez in Venezuela), and one from 2014 to date (from the start of the 
intensification of the emigration flow).  
This paper explains the context of the situation that has led to the migration of more than 10% of the 
Venezuelan population; it evaluates the migration patterns and analyses the issues surrounding the integration 
of Venezuelans into local societies in Latin America.  
Context 
For most Venezuelan migrants, the first country of entry is Colombia, and most cross one of the three major 
entry points connecting the Colombian Norte de Santander region with the Venezuelan Táchira region. The 
three bridges1 over the Táchira River that separates the countries are the Simon Bolivar Bridge, the Francisco 
de Paula Santander Bridge, and the Tienditas Bridge. The first two bridges are significantly named after very 
noteworthy leaders of the Wars of Independence against Spain, and key players for Colombian and Venezuelan 
history: Simon Bolivar, El Libertador, Venezuelan leader and first president of Gran Colombia (1819-1830); and 
Francisco de Paula Santander, Colombian leader (born in the border region) and Vice-president of Gran 
Colombia (1821-1827). The third bridge, with a less significant name, was the location for the Venezuela Aid 
Live concert, sponsored by Richard Branson – where a number of Venezuelan and international artists 
performed and expressed their opposition to the current Venezuelan regime. These bridges have been closed 
at different times by both governments in the past few years, coinciding with both local events and following 
the deterioration of diplomatic relations between the two countries – including closures during the national 
strikes in Colombia, and following the Venezuela Aid Live concert. The bridges not only demonstrate the 
geographical, historical and cultural ties between the countries, but are also symbols of the politicisation of 
the migration flows. 
1 A fourth bridge connects the Colombian Arauca region with the Venezuelan Ápure region, named José Antonio Páez, 
after another leader of the War of Independence against Spain.  
2First Migration Wave 
The Venezuelan economy has been highly dependent on oil revenues, especially since 1999 when Hugo Chavez 
came to power. His government implemented a number of socialist policies, including large programmes of 
social assistance, housing, health and education – the so-called Misiones – the funding of which was heavily 
reliant on oil revenues. Simultaneously were introduced a number of economic policies that discouraged 
private sectors of the economy from developing, and included price controls and expropriations.  
Chavez’s rise to power signalled the start of the first wave of emigration from Venezuela: it included many of 
his detractors, who disagreed with his policies and/or tried to protect their economic assets; as well as 
individuals who felt persecuted, such as civil servants who took part in anti-government strikes and were fired 
and blacklisted because of it. A 2015 report stated that 90% of the migrants up to 2014 had university degrees 
(Paez 2015), suggesting that the migration up to that point was composed of a very specific group of individuals. 
The heavy reliance of the Venezuelan economy on oil revenues brought serious economic problems with the 
sharp fall of oil prices in 2008. Oil plummeted from $164.22 per barrel in June 2008 to $50.68 by January 
2009(OPEC 2019) – which led to a shrinking of the Venezuelan economy by 5.8% in 2009. Various economic 
measures were introduced to counter the downturn; however, these failed to stimulate the economy, and 
inflation reached over 30% (IMF). The final year of the first migration wave also saw a significant political change 
in 2013, as Chavez died and was replaced by Nicolas Maduro. Elections followed soon after and Maduro won 
with just over 1% of the vote, and with widespread allegations of fraud.  
The Second Migration Wave 
2014 was a significant year, as the price of oil suffered another slump, falling from $112 per barrel in June to 
$62 in December (OPEC 2019), having a deep impact on Venezuelan economy. The recession deepened and 
inflation grew, reaching over 60% - the highest in the Americas. 2014 also saw the first major anti-government 
protests, with over three months of demonstrations, and over 40 people dying (ICG 2016). This year also 
signalled the beginning of the second wave of migration. 
From then on, the levels of inflation have kept rising. The IMF (2020) states that inflation in Venezuela reached 
438% in 2017, and that it skyrocketed to 65,000% in 2018 and 200,000% in 2019. It estimates that the 2020 
inflation rate will be around 500,000%.  
The crisis is not only economic, but also social and political, and the security situation has heavily deteriorated. 
The Venezuelan Observatory of Violence (2019) states that homicide rates rose to around 90 per 100,000 
inhabitants between 2015 and 2017 – the second highest in the world, after El Salvador. In addition, there has 
been an increased presence of the so-called colectivos, of Colombian irregular guerrilla and paramilitary groups 
in the border regions, a growth in illegal gold mining, and widespread allegations of drug trafficking. 
3There has also been a drastic shortage of food, medicines and medical equipment, many of which used to be 
imported and paid for with money from oil revenues. In fact, the Venezuelan Health Observatory2 (2018) 
reports that 94% of the population cannot afford the Basic Food Basket and that 64% of Venezuelans lost 
around 11 kg of weight in 2016-17 due to lack of food.3 Similarly, Mazuera et. al. (2019) estimate that three 
million civil servants and five million pensioners live below the extreme poverty line – under two dollars a day. 
A large number of Venezuelan NGOs are currently focused on smuggling these items into Venezuela. 
Politically, Maduro has kept losing popularity, both nationally and internationally. In December 2015, the 
opposition won two thirds of parliamentary seats in the National Assembly, but the Maduro government 
introduced several obstacles, which prevented it from functioning properly, including the creation of a rival 
Constituent Assembly in 2017 and the political persecution of many opposition politicians. Many of them are 
currently in Venezuelan jails or in exile, in foreign embassies in Venezuela or have fled abroad. There have 
been further protests almost every year since then, and hundreds of people have died protesting.  
A tweet from Venezuelan journalist Luz Dary Depablos from March 2019 shows a number of makeshift bridges 
made out of stone crossing the Táchira River that marks the Colombian-Venezuelan border. When border is 
closed and people are not allowed to use the three bridges mentioned above, individuals create improvised 
platforms to cross the river and the border. The post states: “This was the scene this morning at a crossing 
through one of the main back-door paths of San Antonio del Táchira. You have to pay two thousand Colombian 
pesos to get access to the path and then a “donation” of another 500 hundred or one thousand pesos to cross 
one of the improvised bridges.” Two thousand Colombian pesos amount to only around 50 cents (USD), a 
seemingly small amount, but a significant one for Venezuelans. 
Current Economic Situation in Venezuela 
The rate of inflation has impacted Venezuelans’ earning power and has gravely devaluated its currency, the 
Venezuelan Bolivar. On top of the minimum wage, many Venezuelans are entitled to receive food stamps – 
the so-called ‘ticket socialista’ vouchers. As can be seen in Table 1, these added up to 65,000 Bolivares up until 
September 2019. However, by July 2019 the Basic Food Basket was already costing more than one million six 
hundred thousand Bolivares (1,600,000 VES), making basic items prohibitive for many Venezuelans. The 
rampant inflation and currency devaluation also meant that this income plummeted from $10.59 in May 2019 
to only $2.59 in September 2019. 
2 Observatorio Venezolano de la Salud (OVS). 
3 Their previous estimate was a weight loss of 8.6kg (19 pounds) in 2015-16 suggesting that the food scarcity worsened. 
4May 2019 September 2019 October 2019
Minimum 
Wage 
40,000 VES Minimum 
Wage 
40,000 VES Minimum 
Wage 
150,000 VES
Ticket Socialista 25,000 VES Ticket Socialista 25,000 VES Ticket Socialista 150,000 VES
Total 65,000 VES Total 65,000 VES Total 300,000 VES
Equivalence in 
dollars 
$10.59 Equivalence in 
dollars 
$2.59 Equivalence in 
dollars 
$6.19
Table 1 – Monthly income in Venezuela 
This means that in May 2019 the fee to join the path mentioned in the tweet above, without the donation, 
would account for 5% of monthly income. In September 2019, this fee would have accounted for over 20% of 
the monthly income4. The Venezuelan government decided to tackle this issue by raising the minimum wage 
and food stamps allowance, increasing the overall earnings to 300,000 VES or $6.19. However, if the IMF 
inflation estimates for 2020 are correct (500,000%), any gains made by the rise will be erased. The February 
2020 exchange rate means the 300,000 Bolivares are already only worth around $4. 
Migration Patterns 
Data from the IOM and UNHCR for the different years of migration shows a difference in the destination 
countries of the Venezuelan migrants (see Table 1). The countries with the largest number of Venezuelan 
migrants in 2015 were the USA, Spain and Italy; in 2017, this changed to Colombia, the USA and Spain; and in 
2019 to Colombia, Peru, and the USA. Non-Latin American countries feature prominently during the first 
wave of migration. The USA, Spain, Italy, and Portugal are all countries that can be considered difficult to 
migrate to, at least for Latin Americans. The data suggests that the first wave of migration had the economic 
and/or socio-political capital to migrate. This included wealthier individuals (as stated, most had university 
qualifications), and many had dual citizenship. Venezuela was a powerful magnet for migrants during its many 
years of economic prosperity, and sizeable numbers of Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese, Chileans and 
Colombians settled there. Many of their descendants, with dual nationalities, were also part of that first wave. 
4 The Venezuelan government re-opened the border in June 2019 
52015 (IOM)5 2017 (IOM) June 2019 (UNHCR)6
USA 255,520 Colombia 255,520 Colombia 1,3 million
Spain 165,895 USA 290,224 Peru 768,000
Italy 48,970 Spain 208,333 Chile 288,000
Colombia 48,714 Chile 119,051 Ecuador 263,000
Portugal 24,174 Argentina 57,127 Brazil 168,000
Mexico 15,959 Italy 49,831 Argentina 130,000
Total 687,567 Total 1,622,109 Others 1,1 million
Table 2 
However, the data for the second wave shows a different scenario. The previous top destinations of wealthier 
countries start sliding down the table and most of the growth in migrant numbers is seen within Latin America. 
As can be seen from Table 2, there has been a massive increase in the number of migrants within Latin America. 
As of October 2019, the UNHCR estimates that 4.5 million Venezuelans had left the country, and that 3.8 
million were living in Latin America. The total number is expected to reach 6.5 million by the end of 2020, 
which would be around 20% of the population. 
The UNHCR figures estimate that there are 1.3 million Venezuelans in Colombia, however, it is very difficult 
to know the actual number and the figure is likely to be much higher. As was seen in the photo before, the 
borders are extremely porous and difficult to control. The figures also do not include Venezuelans who have 
dual Colombian-Venezuelan nationality, or the over 50,000 weekly ‘pendular’ migrants – who regularly cross 
the border to buy food, medicine and other supplies. 
With the large numbers of migrants, a prevalent issue is what terms to use to define them. Some of the 
migrants are political refugees as they have been persecuted by the Venezuelan government and fall under the 
regulations of the Geneva Convention of 1951 7 . Accordingly, they have been granted political asylum. 
However, many have migrated because of economic reasons – not only to try to improve their living standards, 
but because of the dire socio-economic situation in Venezuela. Therefore, rather than simply labelling them 
5 2015 and 2017 numbers from the International Organisation for Migration 
6 2019 numbers only for Latin America, from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
7 The convention states in Article 1 (A2) that a refugee is one that: “…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” 
6economic migrants, the idea of Survival Migrants (Betts 2013) is more suitable: migrants that are not technically 
refugees under international law, but are still fleeing fragile and failed states, where their wellbeing and survival 
are being threatened by the situation in which the country finds itself. In the case of Venezuela, the government 
is not directly persecuting all migrants, but they have all suffered from the declining economic situation, the 
hyperinflation, the food and medicine shortages, and the increased insecurity. 
According to data from Mazuera et. al. (2019), in April 2019 more than 50% of migrants crossing the land 
border into Colombia were under 29, around 40% of all the migrants had a university degree, less than 20% 
had no qualifications, and more than 85% wanted one day to return to Venezuela. Their main destinations 
were Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Chile. Even though the second wave is much more pluralistic than the first 
one, many of those migrating are still professionals and/or young individuals, which can be an asset to the 
receiving country. 
Desired and Undesired Foreigners 
The idea of migrants being assets to the host countries is connected to ideas of ‘desired’ migrants, i.e. those 
that are considered to be beneficial to the country, as opposed to those that are not. My previous work on 
Middle Eastern migrants to Latin America discusses the idea of ‘desired’ and ‘undesired’ foreigners (Devis-
Amaya 2014; 2019) and it is useful to include it here as it is helpful to understand the current situation. Alfaro-
Velcamp (2013) argues that historically foreigners in Mexico were either ‘desired’ or ‘undesired’ based on the 
colour of their skin: white Europeans and North Americans were seen as desirable, welcomed into local 
societies, and allowed to access its elite social, economic and political circles. However, black and brown 
foreigners, mainly from Asia and Africa, were seen as ‘undesirable’, were discriminated against, and had serious 
difficulties entering local networks. She states that in order to avoid this discrimination, these migrants had to 
fully integrate into society and eventually forget their connections to their ancestral homelands. She argues, 
however, that Middle Eastern migrants were in a midway position: being neither white, nor black, they found 
themselves in the middle ground, where their economic success would define their status as ‘desirable’ or 
‘undesirable’. Successful Middle Easterners came to be seen as ‘desirable’ and were able to enjoy the benefits 
of other ‘desired’ foreigners. However, those not economically successful had to completely integrate to avoid 
becoming ‘undesirable’. 
This argument can be further extended to the rest of Latin America, as it not only applies to Mexico, but also 
to other countries in the region. Indeed, as previously demonstrated by Wade (2002) and Chua (2003), race 
and class are closely connected in Latin America, and the wealthier someone is, the whiter they are perceived 
to be within society.  
These ideas are interesting to test within the current context of Venezuelan migrants to analyse their 
‘desirability’. From the outside, the migration is seen as very similar to the host communities as these 
7populations share a common history, religion and language, and have similar cultures and ethnic make-up. 
However, from within the countries, differences are sometimes highlighted by individuals or in the press. 
The Venezuelan migration flow is not a ‘white’ migration that would automatically grant them ‘desired’ status, 
as it includes a mix of individuals from different backgrounds, different levels of education, and different socio-
economic statuses. My hypothesis is that the categories of ‘desired’ and ‘undesired’ migrants still applies to the 
Venezuelans migrants and that their socio-economic status is playing, and will play, a very important part in 
this differentiation. In my initial interviews in Bogotá, Colombia, the Venezuelan participants already reported 
different experiences of discrimination: some stated that they have been subjected to racial slurs because of 
their nationality, often stressing the word ‘veneco’ with a profanity attached; others say they try to blend in as 
much as possible, hiding their accents in public places to avoid being targeted; whilst some others deny having 
ever received any sort of discrimination. It will be necessary to determine the connections between this 
discrimination, whether perceived or real, to the personal characteristics of the individuals. 
In this case, it is the locals who are making the differentiation – showing that even though the migration has 
similar traits to the host society, there are still differences that allow for a classification of ‘otherness’ that may 
be quantified into ‘desirability’. Venezuelan migrants have to learn how to navigate these differences, either by 
succeeding economically and becoming part of the ‘desired’ category, or by fully integrating into the local 
society to avoid becoming part of the opposite ‘undesired’ category. Different actors have a role to play in this 
transition to ensure discrimination does not lead to a wider perception of Venezuelans as ‘undesirable’. This 
includes the national and local governments, the media, international organisations working in the country, the 
private sector, the migrant organisations, and the general public – both host and migrant. A number of serious 
cases of xenophobia have already been reported in the media, including increased discrimination and attacks 
to Venezuelan migrants in Ecuador (Pugh et al. 2020) and Brazil, and the tightening of immigration rules in 
various Latin American countries. My current research looks into these areas: the integration of Venezuelan 
migrants into local communities; the extent to which they are experiencing discrimination; the role of different 
actors both in terms of encouraging integration and combating discrimination; as well as security issues, both 
perceived and real, that accompany the migration flow. The migration of Venezuelans within Latin America is 
a topic that will be present for decades to come, and local actors must be prepared to handle it.  
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